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1 - Introduction 
According to the demand orientated theory, the capital stock, and net or 
gross investment, are endogenous in the growth process responding to changes 
in demand conditions (output), and the whole process is explained by the well 
known theory of the accelerator principle. This approach is opposed to the neo-
classical theory where the capital stock and investment are derived indirectly 
(as factor inputs) from the production function, and hence exogenously deter-
mined by factors such as, the price of output, the user cost of capital, profits, 
etc., which maximize capital accumulation and investment decisions. In this paper, 
the principle of the accelerator mechanism will be tested and adapted to changes 
in demand conditions, such as changes in output, changes in export perform-
ance, changes in credit conditions, etc., which leads to the well known flexible 
accelerator mechanism. The whole process will be modeled with different speci-
fications of the investment demand function (at the macro level) and will be tested 
empirically. In particular, the empirical testing will examine two main hypotheses: 
the relative importance of demand factors and relative prices in the investment 
function for Greece, and the external constraint hypothesis in the investment 
function for Greece and Portugal. 
2- Theoretical considerations on the determinants of the investment func-
tion 
The controversy of the crucial determinants of investment is between the 
neoclassical school led by Jorgenson and the demand orientated theorists. 
Jorgenson (1963, 1971) argues that relative prices of output and factor inputs 
are important determinants of investment while the demand orientated analysis 
based on the accelerator principle considers that changes in output (demand 
factors) are mostly important and relative prices unimportant. 
The contrast of the two approaches shows fundamental differences, the 
most important being that the former is based on supply factors as the determi-
nants of investment behaviour (mainly reflected by the impact of relative factor 
() This paper is a part of chapter 4 of my Ph. D. thesis presented at the University of Kent 
at Canterbury. I am very grateful to Professor A. P. Thirlwall and other staff of the Keynes College 
at Canterbury. 
C) Faculdade de Economia da Universidade de Coimbra. 
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prices), and the latter focuses on the changes in demand conditions as the major 
determinants of investment. However, the empirical framework of the two ap-
proaches does not reflect the extent of the theoretical gap, since the neo-clas-
sical theory also uses the accelerator mechanism and their findings suggest that 
the most significant determinant in the investment function is output (1). 
Among other theories of investment is the profit (or liquidity) theory of in-
vestment which postulates that the optimal capital stock is some function of the 
level of profits or expected profits, where actual profits in the past are used to 
predict expected profits. The accelerator theorists argue that, since profits would 
be expected to be some function of the level of output or sales, the above models 
empirically are indistinguishable from the accelerator type functions. Within this 
type of research Eisner (1962) provided evidence that profits were only a proxy 
variable which lost their significance when sales were included. Evans (1969), 
contributing to the dispute of whether profits are important in the investment 
function, argued that the fact that firms invest to maximize future profits does 
not necessarily imply that high future profits are translated into higher invest-
ment. It is only if sales are high that more investment will be needed to maxi-
mize profits. What determines the long-run investment decision. is the produc-
tion function behaviour and not the profit rate. This view is consistent with the 
demand side theorists (see Kaldor, 1955), that profit is the result of investment 
by entrepreneurs, not its cause. 
Several other macroeconomic variables have been included in the macro-
investment function to test their significance. Green and Villanueva (1991) in a 
study referring to 23 developing countries during the period 1975-87 found evi-
dence that the ratio of private investment to GOP was positively related to real 
GOP growth, the level of per capita income, and the rate of public sector in-
vestment, and negatively related to real interest rates, domestic inflation, the debt-
service ratio, and the ratio of the external debt to GOP. The inclusion of the per 
capita income variable in the investment function has been justified by the fact 
that higher income countries have a greater ability to devote resources to sav-
ing, and hence a substantial part of investment projects can be financed through 
domestic savings. Regarding the effects of the public sector investment, it has 
been argued that public investment activity may be complementary or a substi-
tute for private investment, thus generating crowding-in or crowding-out effects 
respectively. The crowding-in effects are generally longer-term effects, related to 
public investment activities which involve useful infrastructure systems (such as 
transportation, schools, water and telecommunication systems). Projects in these 
areas influence positively the expected return on private investment (especially 
those activities directly affected) and encourages further investment. On the other 
hand, the crowding out results are shorter-term effects, which may occur when: 
the public sector is involved in parastatal enterprises producing goods that com-
pete with the private sector, and therefore, in this case public investment dis-
(1) For more details on the differences between the neo-classical approach to investment 
and the accelerator principle see Soukiazis (1995). The same author also provides extensive 
empirical evidence which confirms the validity of the accelerator principle in the case of the OECD 
countries. 
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places private investors from profitable projects opportunities; when high public 
deficits (financed by bond issues) lead to higher interest rates and restricts credit 
demand by the private sector; when the public deficit is financed by monetary 
expansion causing inflation and business uncertainty, and finally, when the funding 
of the deficit is made through external debt which reduces the confidence of 
foreign and domestic investors. In a study for the Indian economy considering 
18 sectors, Pradhan, et al. (1990) provide evidence which shows that public in-
vestment crowds out private investment in the short-run, but in the long-run, total 
investment and generally the whole economy is better off with increased public 
investment. Tun and Wong (1982) in a study of five countries (Greece, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico and Thailand) provide evidence which confirm that government 
investment, the change in credit conditions to the private sector and capital in-
flow to the private sector (foreign direct investment), play important roles in 
determining private investment. Finally, FitzGerald, Jansen and Vas (1993) de-
veloped an alternative approach showing that the external constraint hypothesis 
on investment is significant especially for the less developed countries. Accord-
ing to this approach, import capacity plays an important role in determining pri-
vate investment, and external factors, such as, export competitiveness, struc-
ture of international specialization, the terms of trade, capital inflows and external 
debt (or interest payments on debt) can affect seriously funds available for in-
vestment. 
There is an unlimited volume of empirical studies in the investment litera-
ture and the results are contradictory, and little agreement exists on the appro-
priate form of the investment function. This is because there are differences in 
the specification of the investment function, in the definition of the variables, in 
the time period studied, in the data used, in the estimation method, and so on. 
Perhaps the most convincing conclusion of the empirical work is the statement 
that some index of future output or demand is more important than expected 
relative prices in explaining investment behaviour (2). There are however two 
problems stemming from this. The first is to find an adequate measure of de-
mand, and the second is to find an appropriate specification to incorporate a 
measure of future demand into the investment function~ A common consensus 
is that investment responds more rapidly to changes in output (with a shorter 
lag) than to changes in relative prices. As a policy implication, this evidence 
would suggest that changes in aggregate demand is a more potent factor af-
fecting investment. 
3 - The investment function of Greece 
In this section we focus on Greece (3) and an attempt is made to identify 
the main determinants which can explain the investment pattern over the last 
(2) Nickell (1978) argues that the omission of any direct demand proxy, such as sales, out-
put, gross national product and orders is a serious mis-specification of the investment function. 
(3) It was not possible to find a similar data structure for Portugal and to provide a similar 
empirical analysis for this country. 
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three decades. For this reason some important key-series are given in table 3.1 
below, which are divided into two sets: the first characterized as the set of the 
quantity variables, columns (1) to (8); and the second, as the set of the price 
variables, columns (9) to (13). In particular: column (1) and (2) record the ratio of 
the real gross private and public investment to gross national income, PR/IGN/ 
and PUBI/GNI respectively, over the period 1954-1988; in column (3) and (5) are 
the growth rates of the real gross national income ( GGN~ and gross domestic 
product ( GGOP), over the period 1955-1988 and 1961-1991, respectively; columns 
(4) and (6) give the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to GOP and the growth 
rate in manufacturing investment, GFCF!GDP and GMI respectively, over the period 
1960-1991 and 1958-1990; column (7) gives the growth rate of real exports ( GX) 
for the period 1961-1991, and column (8) provides the growth rate of manufactur-
ing output ( GMQ) from 1958 to 1990. The set of the price variables reports: col-
umn (9) the nominal interest rate (ni) measured by the discount rate of the cen-
tral Bank of Greece; column (1 0) reports the real long-term interest rate (ri), 
measured as the difference (r- f..p), where r is the banks' interest rate for long 
term industrial loans and p is the implicit investment price deflator in manufactur-
ing; column (11) is a measure of profitability (prof) in the manufacturing sector, 
defined as the ratio of net profits to own capital; column (12) gives a measure of 
the labour cost, defined as the change in real wages in manufacturing, (rw), and 
finally, column (13) reports the inflation rate (inf), as derived from the consumer 
price indices (4). The same table also reports the average values of the respec-
tive series for the entire period and some subperiods. 
A preliminary inspection of the data reveals that, on average, in the pre-
1973 period there was a higher ratio of private investment than in the post-
1973 period (16.2% versus 14.4 %); higher total gross investment (27.0 % ver-
sus 20.8 %), and higher growth rate of manufacturing investment (10.2% versus 
0.7% and 3.2 %). The above performance was associated with a higher ratio 
of government investment (7.1 % versus 6.1 %), a higher growth rate of gross 
national income (6.7% versus 2.1 %) or gross domestic product (7.4% versus 
2.2 %), a higher rate of growth of manufacturing output (8.9% versus 1.5 %) 
and higher export growth (13% versus 6.4 %). Over the years 1968-1973, in-
vestment performance was the best ever, with private and public investment 
achieving the highest rates as a percentage of GNI, with 21.3% in 1973 for the 
former and 9.4% in 1972 for the latter. The ratio of total gross investment to 
GOP is also the highest in 1973 (31.4 %), and the rate of growth of manufac-
turing investment rose again to high levels (more than 1 0 % and 17.6 % in 1970) 
after a two-year slump in 1966-1967. That was the time of especially high out-
put growth rates (more than 5% per year), high export growth (23% in 1972-
1973), and favourable developments in profits and input costs (negative real 
interest rates and slow or negative real wage growth). As Kaskarelis (1993) 
explains, in the post-war period, several investment incentives had been intro-
duced by the Greek authorities, such as low interest rates for long-term loans 
to the industrial sector, tax benefits, exemptions from import duties, etc., all 
measures which had the objective of creating favourable conditions in the pro-
ductive structure orientated to export markets. 
(4) A detailed definition of the variables and data sources are given in table (3.1 ). 
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TABLE 3.1 
The investment pattern of Greece and some important determinants 
PRI/GNI GPUB//GNI GGN/ GFCF/GDP GGDP GMJ GX GMO% ni I ri I prof I rw I in! (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
1954 ················································ 10.9 3.15 - - - - - - 10.0 
1955 ················································ 11.4 4.12 6.6 - - - - - 9.0 
1956 ................................................ 12.5 5.36 8.7 - - - - - 10·.0 
1957 ················································ 11.6 5.58 6.2 - - - - - 10.0 
1958 ················································ 14.3 6.08 3.5 - - 20.9 - 9.9 11.0 13.7 5.6 6.2 
1959 ················································ 13.4 6.31 3.9 - - -12.0 - 1.0 9.0 - 4.8 7.5 -12.8 
1960 ················································ 14.7 7.32 3.4 23.8 - - 7.0 - 9.3 6.0 - 0.2 11.1 - 1.5 
1961 ················································ 13.5 8.52 10.8 23.2 10.6 23.5 13.6 4.8 6.0 6.6 8.7 9.0 1.19 
1962 ················································ 15.1 8.56 0.9 24.7 1.5 16.4 10.4 5.0 6.0 - 4.5 11.0 - 8.0 0.00 
1963 ················································ 15.1 6.73 9.7 23.7 9.7 2.5 6.5 11.1 5.5 6.9 12.0 4.9 3.53 
1964 ················································ 17.6 8.88 7.3 26.4 7.9 24.8 2.0 10.0 5.5 3.5 10.4 6.9 0.00 
1965 ················································ 18.4 8.06 8.8 27.2 9.0 21.9 12.0 7.9 5.5 7.4 11.1 8.8 3.41 
1966 ················································ 18.2 7.33 5.2 26.4 5.9 - 5.1 34.5 13.6 5.5 1.5 8.8 5.8 5.49 
1967 ················································ 16.3 7.29 4.7 24.7 5.3 - 9.6 5.3 2.6 4.5 4.2 5.9 7.8 1.04 [,(1 
1968 ················································ 19.7 6.66 5.7 28.0 6.4 18.0 - 0.8 7.0 5.0 3.1 7.9 2.6 1.03 <:! 
1969 ················································ 21.0 8.39 8.7 30.3 9.4 15.1 14.4 10.7 6.5 9.6 12.3 12.1 2.04 "' 0 "' 1970 ················································ 19.3 7.78 7.9 27.7 7.7 17.6 12.2 10.2 6.5 - 0.2 15.3 - 1.8 3.00 ill 
1971 ················································ 19.3 8.55 8.2 29.4 6.9 10.0 11.9 9.5 6.5 - 2.9 11.7 - 2.4 2.91 [\1 
1972 ················································ 0.5 9.37 8.7 31.3 8.5 17.4 23.0 14.3 6.5 - 5.3 12.8 -3.8 4.72 ~ 
1973 ················································ 21.3 8.44 8.2 31.4 7.0 8.6 23.3 14.8 9.0 - 5,4 18.5 1.2 15.32 0 
1974 ················································ 15.7 7.51 - 2.1 24.2 -3.7 3.3 0.2 - 2.0 8.0 - 8.2 13.3 5.0 26.56 ~ 
1975 ················································ 15.5 9.12 4.5 22.9 5.9 -13.0 10.7 4.4 10.0 - 4.6 6,5 6.9 13.58 ~ 
1976 ················································ 16.0 8.22 5.6 23.0 6.2 - 1.7 16.3 10.0 10.0 - 5.0 7.1 9.6 13.04 
1977 ················································ 17.7 5.34 3.6 23.9 3.4 - 3.3 1.8 1.5 11.0 - 2.3 4.9 6.1 12.50 
~ 
I 
1978 ················································ 17.5 5.15 5.4 23.8 6.5 -10.7 16.3 7.3 14.0 - 4.0 3.8 6,3 12.39 "' 
1979 ················································ 18.2 5.41 4.4 24.9 3.6 21.0 6.8 5.9 15.9 - 3.0 8.0 1.6 19.01 
~
1980 ················································ 16.4 5.18 2.1 22.9 1.7 7.6 6.9 1.0 19.8 - 0.7 7.8 6.5 
24.92 ~ 
1981 ················································ 14.8 5.19 - 0.1 21.2 0.0 - 7.1 - 5.9 - 1.3 20.5 2.0 5.4 8.1 24.55 --
1982 ················································ 14.1 5.55 0.0 20.7 0.4 - 5.9 - 7.2 - 5.3 20.5 2.2 -4.7 15.1 
20.94 lE" 
1983 ················································ 13.1 6.34 - 0.7 20.3 0.4 - 7.2 7.9 - 0.4 20.5 - 3.7 - 3.5 
- 4.0 20.20 i1\ ~ 
1984 ················································ 11.2 6.85 2.0 18.7 2.7 - 1.3 16.9 2.2 20.5 3.3 -13.6 8.7 
18.36 0 
1985 ················································ 11.1 7.34 2.4 19.1 3.1 - 9.0 1.3 1.2 20.5 0.7 -11.7 0.7 
19.33 -
Ul ~ ..... 1986 ················································ 11.3 5.99 0.1 17.6 1.6 17.3 14.0 - 0.7 20.5 - 5.6 - 0.4 -11.6 23.00 " 
U1 
1\) 
I PRI/GNI GPUB/IGN/ GGNI GFCF/GDP GGDP GM/ GX GMO% ni ri prof rw inf 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
1987 ................................................ 11.7 4.23 0.2 16.8 - 0.7 - 2.0 16.1 - 2.1 20.5 9.6 2.4 3.2 16.42 
1988 ................................................ 12.4 4.17 4.5 17.6 4.0 11.3 8.9 5.0 19.0 7.8 1.1 4.2 13.48 
1989 ................................................ - - - 18.7 3.4 5.0 1.4 2.3 19.0 1.6 5.1 - 3.0 13.72 
1990 ................................................ - - - 19.8 - 0.1 8.3 0.9 - 2.8 19.0 13.3 4.9 3.4 20.40 
1991 ................................................ - - - 19.1 1.8 - 2.5 - 19.0 - - - 19.51 
Average: 
1954-1988 ....................................... 15.4 6.7 4.7 - - - - - - - - - -
1954-1973 ....................................... 16.2 7.1 6.7 - - - - - - - - - -
1974-1988 ······································· 14.4 6.1 2.1 - - - - - - - - - -
1960-1991 ······································· - - - 23.5 4.4 5.3 9.2 - - - - -
1960-1973 ....................................... - - - 27.0 7.4 10.2 13.0 - - - - - -
1974-1991 ....................................... - - - 20.8 2.2 0.7 6.4 - - - - - -
1979-1991 ....................................... - - - 19.8 1.7 3.2 5.4 - - - - - -
1954-1991 ······································· - - - - - - - 5.1 11.9 - - - -
1954-1973 ....................................... - - - - - - - 8.9 7.2 - -
1974-1991 ....................................... - - - - - - - 1.5 17.1 
1979-1991 ....................................... - - - - - - - 0.4 19.6 
1959-1990 ....................................... - - - - - - - - - 1.1 6.3 3.1 12.1 
1958-1973 ······································· - - - - - - - - 2.1 10.7 2.2 3.4 
1974-1990 ······································· - - - - - - - - - 0.2 2.1 3.9 18.4 
1979-1990 - - - - - - - - - 2.3 0.7 2.7 19.5 
List of variables and sources 
(PRI) is gross private investment, (GN/) is gross national income, and (PUB/) is public investment in million drs., and at constant 1970 prices [Paleologos 
(1989), appendix A and 8]. 
( GFCFIGDP) is the ratio of gross fixed capital formation (total gross investment) to GOP at constant 1985 prices (OECD National Accounts). 
( GM/) is the growth rate of investment in the Greek manufacturing sector (gross fixed capital formation in manufacturing at constant 1970 prices, and 
(GMQ) is the growth rate of manufacturing output [Kaskarelis (1993), table 1]. 
(GX) is the rate of growth of real exports (OECD National Accounts). 
(ni) is the interest rate defined as the discount rate of the central bank in Greece, and (inf) is the inflation rate calculated from consumer price indices, 
1985 = 100 (IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook). 
(ri) is the real long-term interest rate obtained from the relation (r- fl.p) were r is the banks' interest rate for long-term industrial loans and p is the 
implicit investment price deflator in manufacturing, (prof) is a measure of capital profitability, defined as the ratio of net profits to own capital, and (rw) is 
manufacturing real wage defined as fl.(w- p) where w is the hourly earnings in manufacturing [Kaskarelis (1993), table 1]. 
{;(! 
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On the other hand, the historical evidence of table 3.1 shows that invest-
ment volume fell rapidly after the two oil price crises (manufacturing investment 
growth reaching its minimum level of -13% in 1975), and the poor investment 
performance after 1973 is accompanied, on average, by lower output and ex-
port growth rates, higher nominal and real interest rates (especially in the latest 
period, 1979-1991), higher real wage growth (3.9% versus 2.2% in the pre-1973 
period), higher inflation rate (18.4% versus 3.4 %) and lower profitability (2.1 % 
versus 10.7% in the pre-1973 period). In general, the evidence indicates that 
investment in Greece responds positively to quantity variables (output, govern-
ment investment, exports) and negatively to relative price variables (interest rates, 
wages, inflation) and this is consistent with the flexible accelerator principle which 
includes both effects. To find the relative importance of the quantity and price 
variables is a question of formulating and estimating the investment function. 
Some alternative specifications of the investment function have been esti-
mated attempting to introduce the set of variables cited in table 3.1 and to 
measure their relative importance. The empirical analysis at this stage will avoid 
the difficult issue of finding the exact functional form of the investment function, 
since there is no agreement on this. Accordingly, the analysis is more of an 
exploratory data analysis, trying to identify the crucial factors which explain pri-
vate investment behaviour in Greece. Within this context, the first estimated 
equation takes the form of an accelerator-relative costs-profits specification and 
considers the ratio of private investment to gross national income as a linear 
function of the lagged real GNI growth rate (the accelerator factor), the ratio of 
public investment to GNI (additional demand factor), the real interest rate and 
real wage rate (input cost factors), and finally the rate of profitability in manu-
facturing (financing constraint factor). The functional specification which attempts 
to reconcile the acceleration theory and neo-classical relative costs theory, as-
sumes the standard acceleration form, and subtracts the relative cost factor, 
taking the form which is explained below (5): 
(3.1) 
where ~ is the coefficient of adjustment, a and c are the coefficients of output 
and relative cost, respectively, in the desired capital stock equation, cr is the 
elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, C is the user cost and W 
the unit cost of labour. If cr = 0, the model is reduced to the flexible accelerator, 
and cr = 1 reflects the pure neo-classical version of the flexible accelerator. 
A number of different forms of equation 3.1 have been estimated, and the 
equation which gives the best results, for the period 1959-1988, is reported below: 
(PR//GN/) 1 = 12.6 + 0.466( GGN/)1_1 + 0.032(PUBIIGNI)1- 0.030(ri)1 + (3.2) 
(6.4) (3.15) (0.105) (-0.33) 
+ 0.088(rw)1+ 0.127(prof)1_1 
(1.17) (1.77) 
(5) For this specification see Kaskarelis (1993). 
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R2 = 0.535, SE = 2.05, OW= 1.48 
Func. form. = 3.88, heter. = 5.40, n = 30 
(1 ,23) (1 ,28) 
The regression results of equation 3.2 indicate that the accelerator is the 
predominant factor in explaining private investment in Greece, both in terms of 
its absolute magnitude and its statistical significance. The effect of public invest-
ment is positive, and this supports the hypothesis of «crowding-in, effects of 
public investment to private investment with complementary characteristics. How-
ever, its importance is dubious since it is found to be statistically insignificant (6). 
The effect of the real interest rate as a factor cost occurs with the negative 
sign, as expected, but it is also not statistically significant. On the other hand, 
the effect of real wages carries the wrong (positive) sign, but it is not statisti-
cally significant. Finally, lagged profits are found to affect positively private in-
vestment, and its impact is statistically significant at the 1 0 percent level. The 
estimated equation 3.2 seems to suggest (with certain statistical limitations), that 
an accelerator-profit, rather than an accelerator-relative cost-profit, version is more 
appropriate to explain private investment in Greece (1). 
It has been argued by Green and Villanueva (1991) that, especially for 
countries with imperfections in capital markets (limited stock exchange markets, 
credit rationing, interest rate ceilings, etc.), income per capita is an important 
factor in the realization of private investment projects, since a substantial part 
must be financed through domestic savings. Within this context, private invest-
ment activity is expected to be positively related to the per capita income vari-
able. To test this hypothesis, the level of per capita income (GDPpc) -at con-
stant 1985 US dollars- has been introduced in equation 3.2 as an additional 
explanatory variable. With this new specification, it can be argued that private 
investment in Greece is financed by two important domestic streams: the re-
tained profits and previously accumulated private savings. When equation 3.2 is 
estimated with the level of per capita income variable, over the period 1960-
1988, it yields the following results: 
(PR//GN/)1= 7.06 + 0.356(GGN/)t-1 + 0.328(PUBIIGN/)1+ (3.3) 
(1.85) (2.42) (1.01) 
+ 0.025(ri)1 + 0.244(prof)1 + 0.118(1W)1 + 0.0012( GDPpc)1 
(0.26) (3.55) (1.75) (1.67) 
R2 = 0.64, SE = 1.81, D. W. = 1.35 
Func. form. = 0.03, heter. = 0.44, n = 29 
(1,21) (1,27) 
(6) Tun Wai and Wong (1982) also found a positive response (and statistically significant) of 
private investment to government investment in the case of Greece. 
C) Kaskarelis (1993) derives the same conclusion estimating an error correction model of 
manufacturing investment in Greece. 
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Comparing equations 3.2 and 3.3 the latter shows an improvement in the 
degree of explanation of the explanatory variables (from 53% to 64 %), a smaller 
standard error of the regression, and an improvement in the acceptance level of 
the functional form and homoscedasticity. The per capita income variable exerts 
a positive impact on private investment and it is statistically significant at the 
1 0 % level. With the introduction of the per capita income variable, the impact 
and significance of the profit and government investment variables have been 
improved, and the constant term is less important. The impacts of the relative 
cost variables, however, continue to be statistically insignificant. The results of 
the estimated equation 3.3, in general, appear to suggest that the accelerator-
profit version of the investment function is improved substantially when the level 
of per-capita income variable is introduced, reflecting the importance of domes-
tic savings as a source of financing investment projects in Greece. 
4 - The importance of the external constraint on investment. The case of 
Greece and Portugal 
It has been argued especially for the case of the developing countries that 
foreign exchange can be a constraint on investment and that investment is very 
sensitive to import capacity. When a country is highly dependent on the import of 
capital goods and other inputs, such as machinery, raw materials, new technol-
ogy, energy etc., and suffers from a chronic deficit on the external account, then 
investment and growth in the long-run is likely to be constrained by a shortage of 
foreign exchange. In this case, normally, the authorities will be forced to regulate 
growth in order to meet balance of payments or exchange rate targets. 
The important issue of the influence of external conditions on investment 
decisions is considered here examining the question of whether the investment 
performance in Greece and Portugal is subject to an external constraint. Greece 
experienced a chronic balance of payments deficit, especially in the post oil-
crisis period, and policy measures have been taken to regulate external imbal-
ances. These measures have often involved short austerity programmes (1983, 
1986, 1990) which have been accompanied by restrictions on demand and high 
interest rates (in order to attract capital flows from abroad), both measures which 
are inimical to the domestic investment environment. Similar balance of payments 
problems appear to explain the external debt crisis in Portugal, especially for 
the period 197 4-1986. The democratization process after the collapse of the 
dictatorial regime in 1974, is characterized by a greater openness and interde-
pendence of the economy with other OECD countries (especially with EEC coun-
tries). The deterioration of the external payments situation forced the country to 
accept the IMF intervention, signing two stand-by agreements in 1979 and 1983 
respectively, followed by the usual structural stabilization programmes and re-
strictive measures on demand. Only since 1986, has Portugal shown signs of 
recovering, which coincides with Portugal's membership of the EC and relative 
political stability. 
To test the external constraint hypothesis in the investment function, 
FitzGerald, Jansen and Vos (1993) have suggested a simple approach where 
investment is a function of the change in import capacity, the latter defined as 
the sum of exports, net capital inflows less the interest payments on external 
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debt. Consequently, import capacity is limited by external factors, such as, ex-
port competitiveness, the terms of trade, external credit rationing and exogenous 
increases in interest rates on outstanding international debt. All the above fac-
tors will reduce funds available for investment. Estimating the above relation, in 
a pooled cross section-time series analysis, for a sample of 22 less developed 
countries, the above authors found a strong positive impact of the change in 
import capacity on private investment, showing that external factors are impor-
tant in explaining private investment behaviour in developing countries. 
A similar approach is used here to test the importance of the external 
constraint on investment behaviour in Greece and Portugal. The model assumes 
that the actual capital stock is exclusively a function of the import capacity, hence 
the investment function based on the accelerator principle can be specified in 
the following simple linear form: 
(4.1) 
where GO/ is gross domestic investment and MC is the capacity to import, both 
measured in domestic currency at 1980 prices (billions of 1980 Greek drach-
mas and Portuguese escudos, respectively), and the data are taken from the 
World Tables of the World Bank (1993). The estimation of equation 4.1, for the 
period 1967-1987, yielded the following results: 
Greece: 
Portugal: 
GD/1= 78.75 + 0.927 DMC1+ 0.736 GD/1_1 
(1.78) (2.46) (5.98) 
R2 = 0.67, SE. = 38.2, 0-h. = 0.14 
Func. form. = 0.25, heter. = 2.16 
(1 ,17) (1 ,19) 
GD/1= 66.89 + 0.242 DMC1+ 0.798 GD/1-1 
(1.56) (1.19) (6.07) 
R2 = 0.64, SE. = 43.2, 0-h. = 1.95 




As can be seen, the estimated equation 4.2 for Greece is well determined, 
showing a strong positive accelerator effect of the change in the capacity to 
import variable on gross domestic investment, and this impact is statistically 
significant at the conventional probability levels. The response of gross invest-
ment to changes in the capacity import variable is also positive in the case of 
Portugal, but statistically insignificant. Further attempts to estimate equation 4.3 
for Portugal, using different sources of data and different periods of estimation, 
showed that the relation is unstable and very sensitive to different periods of 
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estimation. For instance, a regression over the period 1967-1982 gives an esti-
mated coefficient of the change in capacity import variable of 0.493 with a 
t-ratio of 2.66 which is statistically significant at the 5 % level. Another estima-
tion over the short period 1972-1982, gives an estimated coefficient of 1.02 with 
a t-ratio of 3.33. The relation also appeared to be very sensitive to the introduc-
tion of dummy variables expressing the unfavourable conditions of political in-
stability during the democratization process. The most disturbing years appeared 
to be 197 4-1975, during the fall of the dictatorial regime and the installation of 
democracy, and 1984-1985 after the second financial aid agreement with the 
IMF. Despite the statistical inefficiencies in the case of Portugal, the evidence 
for both countries seems to suggest that external market conditions (related to 
the balance of payments performance) have a reasonable influence on the in-
vestment process, and these conditions cannot be ignored when the investment 
activity is modelled. 
To test further the effects of the external factors on investment behaviour, 
an alternative form of the investment function has been estimated where the 
external variables (exports, capital flows, and external debt or interest payments 
on debt) are entered individually. For Greece, the most satisfactory results are 
obtained when the gross domestic investment-output ratio (GO//GOP) is speci-
fied as a function of the growth rate of exports (GX), the growth rate of net 
capital flows ( GNCF) and the change in the amount of the external debt 
(110EB7) (8). All variables are measured in current US dollars, except for the 
investment-output ratio which is measured in domestic currency at 1980 prices 
[the data are taken from the World Bank, World tables (1993)]. The estimated 
equation covers the period 1970-1987 and gave the following results (9): 
Greece: 
(GO//GOP)1= 27.7 + 0.165(GX) 1+ 0.063(GNCF)1- 0.0039(110EBnr (4.4) 
(16.3) (2.61) (2.33) (- 4.20) 
R2 =0.73, SE=3.18, OW= 1.76 
Func. form. = 1.63, heter. = 0.36, 
(1,12) (1,15) 
F- stat. = 15.2, Serial carrel. = 0.012, n = 17 
(3,13) (1 ,12) 
The regression results reveal that the investment-output ratio in Greece is 
positively related to the growth of exports and the growth of capital inflows (1°), 
(8) The change in long-term interest payments on debt has also a negative effect on in-
vestment but was found to be less significant. 
(9) The investment-output ratio measured in dollars at 1985 price level also has been used 
as the dependent variable, but the results were identical to equation 4.4. 
(1°) Tun and Wong (1982), in a study for a sample of developing countries, also found that 
capital' inflows had a positive effect on private investment in Greece, for the period 1960-1976. 
They conclude that foreign capital inflow helps to overcome the savings constraint in the financing 
of investment. 
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and negatively related to the change in the amount of the external debt, and all 
effects are statistically significant at the conventional probability levels. Export 
growth appears to have a more significant impact (in absolute magnitude) on 
gross investment, than other external factors, and this confirms Kaldor's argu-
ment that the growth of exports is a fundamental determinant of investment, and 
in some circumstances is the engine of economic growth. The negative effect 
of the change in external debt (or interest payments on debt) shows that this 
factor is a significant external constraint on gross investment in Greece. 
In the case of Portugal, some selected estimated equations are reported 
below which give some insights into the importance of the external determinants 
of investment and the relevance of the external constraint hypothesis: 
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Portugal - period 1971-1989: 
(GO//GOP)1 = 10.07 + 0.113(GX)1+ 0.0016(dNCF)1- 0.00024(0EBT)1_1 + (4.5) 
(1.51) (2.18) (1.57) (-1.69) 
+ 0.702(GO//GOP)r-1 
(4.22) 
R2 = 0.70, SE = 3.22, 0-h = 1.25 
Func. form. = 0.075, heter. = 0.92, n = 18 
(1,12) (1,16) 
Portugal - period 1971-1989: 
(GO//GOP)1 = 9.65 + 0.109(GX)1 + 0.0015(dNCF)1- 0.00032(/NTP)1_1 + (4.6) 
(1.49) (2.10) (1.51) (-1.71) 
+ 0.705(GO//GOP)r-1 
(4.28) 
R2 =0.70, SE=3.21, 0-h= 1.14 
Func. form. = 0.22, heter. = 0.001, n = 18 
(1,12) (1,16) 
Portugal - period 1972-1985: 
( GO//GOP)1 = 10.21 + 0.134( GX)1 + 0.0048(dNCF)1- 0.00016(0EBT)1_1 + (4.7) 
(1.64) (2.18) (3.25) (-1.08) 
+ 0.674(GO//GOP)r-1 
(4.14) 
R2 = 0.74, SE = 2.80, 0-h = 0.86 
Func. form. = 0.85, heter. = 0.45 
(1,12) (1,16) 
Predictive failure = 2.05, n = 14. 
(4,9) 
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Equations 4.5 and 4.6 both estimate the investment-output ratio (GO//GOP) 
of Portugal for the whole period 1971-1989 where data are available, and the 
only difference is that the former uses external debt (DEBT) as an explanatory 
variable and the latter uses the long-term interest payments on the outstanding 
debt (INTP), while all other variables are the same. Both equations confirm that 
the most significant accelerator effect on the investment-output ratio comes from 
the growth of exports. The impact of the change in net capital flows is also 
positive as expected, but not statistically significant. The outstanding debt or the 
external debt service payments of the previous period have also the expected 
negative influence on investment, but are also statistically insignificant. Finally, 
when the estimated equation covers the shorter period 1972-1985, the only in-
significant effect comes from the external debt variable, while the impact of export 
growth and the change in capital flows is relatively stronger on the investment-
output ratio. 
In sum, it has been found that another exogenous demand factor as meas-
ured by the import capacity variable (reflecting the effects of change in external 
conditions) can influence substantially investment behaviour, in countries such 
as Greece and Portugal with balance of payments difficulties. In particular, ex-
port growth seems to exert a dynamic significant influence on investment, and 
to a lesser extent changes in capital flows, while the change in external debt 
(or interest rate payments on debt) seems to suggest a serious external con-
straint on investment, especially in the case of Greece. The empirical analysis 
of Greece and Portugal provides evidence that the increase in export growth 
and reduction in capital flight and external debt are essential to lift existing con-
straints on investment. 
5 - Final concluding remarks 
In first place, the empirical analysis of the private investment function in 
Greece reveals that demand factors, such as, the growth of output, per capita 
income, and to a lesser extent public investment, are important determinants of 
private investment, while relative factor costs are less important. Profitability is 
also shown to have a substantial influence on private investment, suggesting 
that a flexible accelerator-profit variable specification is more appropriate to ex-
plain the private investment pattern in Greece. The empirical analysis has also 
shown that the flexible accelerator-profit specification is improved when per capita 
income is included as an explanatory variable. , 
In second place, the empirical analysis of investment in Greece and Portu-
gal, when modified to include external determinants, shows that gross domestic 
investment is very sensitive (especially for Greece) to changes in external con-
ditions, as measured by the import capacity variable, suggesting that export 
receipts, capital flows and sustained external debt can generate important do-
mestic funds to be allocated to investment projects. The emphasis is given to 
the dynamic effects of exports on investment, which confirms Kaldor's early 
argument that exports can release the foreign exchange constraint and it is the 
only component that can pay the import content of other components of de-
mand, such as investment. 
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